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Causal selection: the linguistic take 
Elitzur A. Bar-Asher Siegal, Noa Bassel and York Hagmayer* 
Abstract. Causal Selection is a widely discussed topic in philosophy and cognitive sci-
ence, concerned with characterizing the choice of “the cause” among the many 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which any effect depends on. In 
this paper, we argue for an additional selection process underlying causal statements: 
Causative Construction Selection (CC-selection), which pertains to the choice of linguis-
tic constructions used to express causal relations. We aim to answer the following 
question: given that a speaker wishes to describe the relation between one of the condi-
tions and the effect, which linguistic constructions are available? We take CC-selection 
to underlie causal selection, since the latter is restricted by the linguistic possibilities re-
sulting from the former. Based on a series of experiments, we demonstrate that factors 
taken previously as contributing to causal selection should, in fact, be considered as the 
parameters that license the various linguistic constructions under given circumstances, 
based on previous knowledge about the causal structure of the world (the causal model). 
These factors are therefore part of the meaning of the causative expressions. 
Keywords. Causation; Causal Selection; Causative Construction Selection; lexical se-
mantics; causal reasoning 
1. Introduction. The double selection problem. The occurrence of any event requires many dif-
ferent conditions to hold (Mill 1884, A System of Logic, Volume I, Chapter 5, §3). More precisely, 
many conditions are individually necessary and only jointly sufficient in order for a target event 
to take place, with several sets of jointly sufficient conditions relating to any event kind (Mackie 
1965). These conditions may include other events, states and constant background conditions, in-
tentional actions or unintentional behaviors by an agent, and/or properties of the patient.  
To take a very simple example, the opening of an automatic door may depend on one suffi-
cient set of conditions including electricity, the door being unlocked, and an agent pressing the 
door-open button. Another sufficient set may include a door handle, the door being unlocked, and 
an agent pushing the handle. Imagine a situation in which a person walks up to the door, pushes 
the button and the door opens. An observer, who wishes to describe what happened, is faced with 
what we call the double selection problem, involving causal selection on the one hand, and causa-
tive-construction selection on the other.  
The first problem has been widely discussed in philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the 
observer has to decide which among the many necessary and – in the particular situation – jointly 
sufficient conditions was the cause of the door opening. Many theoretical accounts have been 
proposed in the recent years, alongside empirical studies testing how people select the cause from 
a set of conditions (Cheng & Novick 1991, Hilton 1990 inter alia). Studies show, for example, that 
an action by an agent that violates social norms is more likely to be considered the cause of an 
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effect than an action which is within normative conventions, even in a situation where both actions 
are necessary for the effect to take place (Hitchcock & Knobe 2009, Reuter et al. 2014, and Icard, 
Kominsky & Knobe 2017 inter alia).  
The second problem has attracted far less attention in the cognitive sciences: in order to differ-
entiate between causes, an observer has to describe the causal relations through an available linguistic 
construction, which involves what we call the Causative Construction Selection (henceforth CC-
selection). In any causal statement, the speaker selects, along with the cause, a linguistic causative 
construction which appropriately describes the relation behind the observed course of events. In the 
above example, an observer may state: the pushing of the button opened the door, or pushing the 
button caused the door to open, to name just two possibilities. The array of causative constructions 
available includes connectives like because (of), from, by, overt causative verbs like make and cause, 
and change-of-state (CoS) verbs such as open and boil, and other options available across languages 
(see Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2020 for a definition of “causative constructions”. For typologies of 
causative constructions see Shibatani 1976, Comrie 1981 and Song 1996). The CC-selection prob-
lem can be phrased in different ways. We will treat it as answering the following question: given that 
a speaker wishes to describe the relation between one of the conditions and the effect, which 
linguistic constructions are available? Notably, this question does not assume singularity of causes. 
That is, with respect to each of the causative constructions, it is possible that more than one condition 
can be described as the cause, and our question aims at discovering the range of linguistic expressions 
that are available. 
CC-selection has largely been ignored in philosophy and psychology, although its relevance has 
been demonstrated by research inspired by linguistic theories (e.g. Wolff 2003). A parallel question 
has been raised within theoretical linguistics (cf. Dowty 1979), where various analyses correlate CoS 
causatives like Mary opened the door with direct rather than indirect causation. An example of the 
latter would be pushing somebody who accidently fell against the door open button (Fodor 1970,   
Shibatani 1976, Wolff 2003 inter alia). Further semantic differences between the various causative 
constructions have been recently raised by Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh (2020) (for discussion on dif-
ferences between specific construction see also Neeleman & van der Koot 2012, Maienborn & 
Herdtfelder 2017, Bar-Asher Siegal & Boneh 2019, Nadathur & Lauer 2020). 
We take CC-selection to be more crucial in the choice of a statement than causal selection, due 
to the fact that causal selection is restricted by the linguistic availabilities resulting from CC-selection. 
Consider again the door example: determining whether “the cause” of the door to open was electricity, 
the person or the pushing of the button requires these possibilities to be stated. The relation between 
causal selection and CC-selection can be observed in experimental studies on causal selection (e.g. 
Knobe and Fraser 2008): First the participant is confronted with a causal scenario, whose under-
lying causal structure is known or provided, and in which (usually) two events occur, followed by 
a target event. The participants are then presented with causal statements, which generally include 
the phrases Event A caused the target event and Event B caused the target event, and asked to 
indicate how much they agree with the given statements. In this common experimental paradigm, 
the researcher pre-selects the causative constructions for the statements they regard as appropriate 
descriptions. Hence the researcher has made an act of CC-selection, based upon which the partic-
ipants are asked to make an act of causal selection.  
In this paper, we demonstrate that CC-selection affects causal judgements, showing first 
which causative constructions are available to observers describing the causal dependency between 
a condition (a member of a sufficient set of conditions) and an effect (Section 2). We explore the 
semantics of causative verbs based on structural equation models, and propose a respective formal 
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theory. Second, we present a series of experiments (Section 3), in which we investigate CC-
selection, showing that participants systematically rate the acceptability of certain causative con-
structions higher under specific conditions. We test how factors that have been shown to affect 
causal selection (cf. Danks 2017) affect CC-selection, including violation of social norms and 
foreseeability of the effect by the involved agents. We show that these factors can be considered 
as the parameters that license the linguistic construction under given circumstances (Section 4). 
These factors, therefore, become part of the meaning/truth-conditions of the causative expressions.  
2. A theory of the semantics of causative constructions.  In linguistics, the object of investiga-
tion into casual statements has traditionally been the structural and interpretative properties of 
causative constructions. Nonetheless, dealing with causation is not trivial within formal ap-
proaches to semantics. The challenge has to do with the fact that formal approaches to the 
semantics of natural languages are truth-conditional and model-theoretic. In such frameworks, the 
meaning of a sentence is taken to be the proposition which is true or false relative to some model 
of the world. It is not trivial, however, to model causal statements, as they do not describe simple 
state-of-affairs in the world, or even in possible worlds. 
 
A Handle: =1 if handle is turned; else =0 
B Lock: =1 if door is locked; else =0 
C Circuit: =1 if closed; else =0 
D Electricity: =1 if running; else =0 
E Button: =1 if pressed; else =0 
F Door opens: =1 if opens; else =0 
G Button =1 ⊨ Circuit =1 
  
Sufficient set H (automatic opening): Circuit =1 & Electricity =1 & Lock =0 ⊨ Door opens =1 
Sufficient set I (manual opening): Handle =1 & Lock =0 ⊨ Door opens =1 
Figure 1: Structural equations and graphical models of two sufficient sets of conditions for an effect F. 
 
Over the last decade, several works have explored the approach developed by Judea Pearl 
(Pearl 2000) in the context of computer science to examine causality through Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM), as a way to provide a model for the truth conditions of causal statements (Baglini 
& Francez 2016, Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal 2020, Nadathur and Lauer 2020). In SEM, causality 
is modeled by graphs that fit networks of constructs to data. On this approach dependencies be-
tween states of affairs are represented as a set of pairs of propositions and their truth values. Here, 
we rely on Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal’s (2020) formal definition for causal models. Considering 
once more the example of the automatic door, we can define the variables (pairs of propositions 
and truth values) in A-F in Figure 1. The fact that some variables depend on others for their value 
is represented by structural entailments in G-I. Variables can be classified as belonging to one of 
two types: Exogenous variables do not depend on any other variable (in the model). The values of 
the endogenous variables, in contrast, are based on the values of variables on which they depend. 
In our door example, the exogenous variables are A, B, D and E. The endogenous variables are C 
and F. Dependencies within the SEM can be represented qualitatively with directed acyclic graphs 
model (as in Figure 1). Nodes correspond to variables, and arrows indicate the direction of de-
pendency: the value of an originating node dictates the value of nodes it points to. Sufficient sets 
are circled (cf. VanderWeele & Robins (2009). 
H 
I 
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Following Mackie (1965), we treat the nodes in the causal model as INUS conditions: a vari-
able or a set of variables which are Insufficient but Necessary alone, but together Unnecessary but 
Sufficient. In our example, when the door is unlocked, a closed circuit with electricity supplied 
constitutes a set which is sufficient but not necessary (since the pair of conditions Unlocked and 
Handle together are also sufficient for opening the door). We follow Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal’s 
(2020) formal system for the definitions of necessary conditions, a sufficient set of conditions and 
situations within the SEM framework. (A situation is defined as a set of pairs of propositions S in 
a language P and their values.) 
In this approach, the SEM encodes speakers’ knowledge of the causal structure. Moreover, 
formal definitions of various types of nodes/conditions (such as INUS), can be used to capture the 
requirements for licensing linguistic judgments, or in our terms – for defining CC-selection. Fol-
lowing Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal (2020), we take a CoS verb applied to a certain condition Q 
representing the cause in the model (“The pushing of the button opened the door”),1 which is part 
of a situation S, to yield an acceptable causal statements under the conditions in (1). Similarly, (2) 
captures the licensing conditions when Q is the subject of an overt causative cause (“Pushing the 
button caused the door the open”): 
 
(1)   ∃Q∃e∃t∃S:SUFF(S)M,R = 1 & (Q ∈ S)M & S(e) & τ(e) ⊆ t & ∀t’ < t∀e’ : τ (e’) ⊆ t’ → [¬Q(e’)]  
(2)   ∃Q∃e∃t∃S:SUFF(S)M,R = 1 & (Q ∈ SM & Q(e)) 
 
The function SUFF(icient) takes a situation (S) – a set of pairs of propositions and their values –  
and returns 1 if it is a sufficient set in the model for a specific result (R). The formula amounts to 
a description of a completion event. Thus, in this line of analysis, lexical causatives select the 
temporally last condition to complete the sufficient set of conditions as its subject (1), while the 
periphrastic causative “cause” selects any condition in the set (2) (i.e., any INUS condition). Bag-
lini & Bar-Asher Siegal (2020) demonstrate that these formal descriptions capture previous 
observations regarding “direct causation” in the literature. The next section presents an investiga-
tion of the claims represented by (1)-(2), in a variety of experiments, showing that while it holds 
to a large degree, it must be slightly modified.  
3. Experiments 
3.1 AIM AND HYPOTHESES. We report on a series of 3 experiments aiming to empirically investigate 
CC-selection, by measuring the effect of the semantics of causative constructions on the acceptance of 
causal statements. Based on the theory described in the previous section, we hypothesized that (1) 
statements with CoS verbs will be more accepted for conditions completing a sufficient set of (preex-
isting) conditions; (2) sentences with an overt cause to construction will only be sensitive to whether 
their subject is an INUS condition for the effect to take place. 
 
3.2 OVERVIEW. We confronted participants with a common effect structure in which two condi-
tions conjunctively generated the target effect. Hence, the two conditions were INUS conditions 
in the terms of Mackie (1965). Participants were presented with various scenarios, in which two 
conditions were generated independently one after the other before the effect took place. We manip-
ulated the temporal order such that both conditions were equally necessary for the effect, but only the 
condition occurring second completed a sufficient set. Participants were asked to rate causal state-
ments referring to each condition individually. One type of statement used a lexical, CoS causative 
(e.g., Suzan opened the window), the second type a periphrastic, overt causative (Suzan caused the 
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window to open). Experiment 1 was designed to show that observers prefer certain causative con-
structions to describe what happened (i.e. CC-selection). Experiment 2 explored how the violation of 
social norms affects CC-selection. Experiment 3 did the same with respect to foreseeability.  
3.3. EXPERIMENT 1. 
DESIGN. The study had a 2 (order of causes) x 2 (causative construction) x 4 (scenario) design. All 
three factors were manipulated within subjects. The study was run anonymously online using lime-
survey (limesurvey.org). According to regulations at the University of Goettingen, no clearance 
by an ethics committee was required. 
PARTICIPANTS. We collected data of 35 participants, 32 of which passed the comprehension test. 
Adult participants were recruited from prolific (prolific.org). English had to be their first language.  
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE. First, participants were informed that we are interested in how peo-
ple use and understand language and that they would be presented with various scenarios and asked 
several questions examining their understanding of the scenario. Then, participants were explicitly 
asked to indicate their informed consent to participate. Next participants were presented with the 
first of four scenarios (Expose/drawings, Flood/land, Open/door, or Set off/alarm). (3) presents the 
the Set off/alarm scenario. The participants were asked to rate four statements according to their 
compatibility with the facts presented in the scenario, as in (4). 
 
(3) The Kagan family has a motion-sensitive security system, which they switch on when they leave 
the house. Last Monday, Mary switched the system on, not knowing that her daughter, Emily, 
was staying at home. When Emily woke up, she passed in front of one of the motion sensors 
and activated it. The alarm went off.  
(4)  (a) Mary set off the alarm.    (b) Emily set off the alarm.  
(c) Mary caused the alarm to go off.   (d) Emily caused the alarm to go off.  
 
The rating scale ranged from 1 (least compatible) to 7 (perfectly compatible). After their answer, 
participants were queried about the order of events to check whether they correctly grasped the 
given information. Participants continued to the next scenario without receiving any feedback. The 
order of the scenarios and the order of the presented statements was randomized.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. In all experiments we used a multilevel model to analyze the data, taking 
into account the design of the study. Factors (here order, causative construction, scenario, and the 
interaction of order and causative construction) were entered as fixed effects. 
 
Figure 2: Results of Experiment 1. Mean ratings of causal statements and 95% confidence  
intervals are shown. Higher ratings indicate higher acceptance. 
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RESULTS.  Figure 2 displays the mean ratings depending on order and causative construction for 
the four scenarios. Across all scenarios, ratings of statements with CoS causatives were highly 
sensitive to order. Ratings were much higher when the condition completed the sufficient set. Rat-
ings for statements involving overt causatives were less sensitive to order. Statements with the first 
causal condition being the subject were rated higher when an overt causative construction was 
used than when a CoS causative was. For the Set off/alarm scenario this means that they rated the 
statement “Mary set off the alarm” as less acceptable than “Mary caused the alarm to go off”. 
There was no difference for statements referring to the second cause, which completed the suffi-
cient set. This pattern was confirmed by the statistical analysis. The multilevel model allowed to 
predict participants’ ratings, LogLik = –41.9, Chi2 = 83.7, p < .0001, R2 = .15. The main effect 
contrast of order was significant, t(474) = 9.45, p <.0001, as was the main effect contrast of caus-
ative, t(474) = 3.32, p = .001, and their interaction, t(474) = 3.66, p =.0003.  
DISCUSSION. The findings provide evidence for CC-selection: participants rated the acceptance of 
causative constructions differently depending on which causal condition the statement referred to. 
When the causal condition completed the sufficient set, overt and CoS causatives were considered 
appropriate. By contrast, CoS causatives were considered less appropriate than overt causatives 
for a necessary condition that did not complete the sufficient set. These findings support our first 
hypothesis: participants were highly sensitive to the completion of a sufficient set when CoS verbs 
were used. Regarding the second hypothesis, we found that participants were less sensitive to a 
completion of a sufficient set for overt causatives.  
3.4 EXPERIMENT 2. In this experiment, we investigated the interaction between CC-selection and 
violation of social norms, which has been shown to strongly affect causal selection (cf. Knobe & 
Fraser 2008, Icard et al. 2017). We hypothesized that a violation would have a stronger impact on 
the acceptance of statements when the subject represents the first condition with overt causatives 
than with CoS causatives.  
DESIGN. The study had a 2 (order of causes) x 2 (causative construction) x 3 (scenario)2 x 2 (first 
agent violates norm vs. second agent violates norm) design. While the first three factors were 
manipulated within participants, the last factor (violation) was manipulated between participants. 
Again, the study was run anonymously online.  
PARTICIPANTS. Seventy-four people participated (37 per violation condition). Five participants 
were excluded, because they failed the comprehension test. Recruitment and selection criteria were 
the same as in Experiment 1. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE. Instructions and the procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Three new scenarios involving two agents were presented (Lock/computer, Set off/alarm, Burst/ 
tank). The lock/computer scenario is presented in (5), with two possible continuations in (a-b). 
Participants were asked to rate the statements in (6) on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 
(completely agree). After providing ratings, participants’ understanding of the scenarios was 
tested. The order of the scenarios and the order of the presented statements was randomized. 
 
(5) The cyber defense company iForce has a secured server which allows only one user to be 
logged into its system at a time. If a second user tries to log in, the system locks itself. According 
to schedule the senior developer Beth works on the system every day between 7:00 and 13:00. 
Her team-mate Frank is scheduled to work on the same system from 13:15 until 19:00. 
                                                 
2 A fourth scenario did not involve agents violating norms and is, therefore, not reported. 
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(a) First agent violates norms: 
…Last week, Beth didn’t pay attention to the time and stayed logged in past 13:00. 
Frank logged in at his regular hour. The system locked.  
(b) Second Agent violates Norms: 
… Last week, Beth worked her regular hours. Frank felt that he was behind on his tasks 
and logged into the system at 12:58. The system locked.  
(6) (a) Beth locked the system,   (b) Frank locked the system,  
(c) Beth caused the system to lock.  (d) Frank caused the system to lock.  
 
RESULTS. The results are depicted in Figure 3. When the second agent violated the norm (lower 
row in Figure 3), the first cause received very low ratings. The second cause (completing the suf-
ficient set) received high ratings regardless of the causative construction. By contrast, when the 
first agent violated the norm (upper row in Figure 3), ratings were sensitive to order and causative 
construction.3 Statements referring to the second cause were rated similarly in the respective sce-
nario given both causative constructions. Statements referring to the first cause, however, were 
accepted more when an overt causative was used. The latter findings replicate the findings of Ex-
periment 1. We also replicated the findings that overt causative statements referring to agents 
violating norms are rated higher than those referring to agents not violating norms (Hitchcock & 
Knobe 2009, Reuter et al. 2014 and Icard, Kominsky & Knobe 2017 inter alia). Importantly, our 
findings show that there is an interaction of causative construction, order, and norm violation.  
 
Figure 3: Results of Experiment 2. Mean ratings of causal statements and 95% confidence  
intervals are shown. Higher ratings indicate higher acceptance. 
 
The descriptive findings were corroborated by the statistical analysis. The multilevel model al-
lowed to predict participants’ ratings, LogLik = –228.9, Chi2 = 457.9, p < .0001, R2 = .42. The 
following effects were significant: main effect of order (F (1,750) = 70.4, p < .0001), main effect 
of causative (F (1,750) = 10.6, p = .001), main effect of violation, (F (1,750) = 7.57, p = 0.006), 
interaction of order and causative (F (1,750) = 9.55, p = .002), interaction of order and violation 
(F (1,750) = 488.0, p < .0001), and the three-way interaction (F (1,750) = 18.9, p < .0001).  
                                                 
3 There is some inter-scenario variation, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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DISCUSSION. These findings again show the significance of CC-selection: participants rated differ-
ent causative constructions differently with respect to the causal condition (here, an agent) the 
statement referred to. They also indicated a subtle interaction of norm violation, order, and causa-
tive construction. Preferences for a specific construction was strongest when the statement referred 
to an agent acting first and violating a norm. In this case, an overt causative was clearly preferred 
over a CoS causative. The fact that participants sometimes preferred a CoS causative for the first 
cause (not completing the sufficient set) over a CoS causative for the second effect (completing 
the sufficient set) indicates that our hypotheses need to be modified. A violation of norms affected 
CC-selection beyond the completion of a sufficient set. 
3.5 EXPERIMENT 3.  In Experiment 2, the norm violator could have foreseen the action of the other 
agent, but the agent conforming to the norm could not. Foreseeability has been shown to moderate 
the effect of norm violation in causal selection (Reuter et al. 2014). Therefore, the aim of Experi-
ment 3 was to explore the effect of foreseeability on CC-selection.  
DESIGN. The study had a 2 (order of causes) x 2 (causative construction) x 4 (scenario) x 2 (first 
agent foresees action of second agent vs. first agent does not foresee action of second agent) mixed 
design. While the first three factors were manipulated within participants, foreseeability was ma-
nipulated between participants.  
PARTICIPANTS. Ninety-four people participated (47 per violation condition). Three participants 
failed the comprehension test and were excluded from the analysis. Recruitment and selection 
criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE. Instructions and procedure were the same as in the previous experi-
ments. Four scenarios were presented to participants (Lock/computer, Stop/elevator, Set off/alarm, 
Open/door). The Lock/computer scenario is given in (7), with two possible continuations in (a-b). Note 
that there was no explicit social norm that forbade the first agent to act. Participants were asked to rate 
on a scale from 1 to 7 how much they agreed with the statements in (8). 
 
(7)  The cyber defense company iForce has a secured server “F1”, which allows only one user 
to be logged into its operation system at the same time. If a second user tries to log in, the 
system locks itself. Frank is the programmer responsible for performing daily checks on the 
F1 system, every day at 2pm.  
(a) First agent foresees second action:  
Beth is Frank’s old teammate and knows about his usual work schedule. Last Monday, 
Beth logged into the system at 1:45pm, knowing that Frank would log in later. Frank 
logged in from his computer at his regular hour. The operation system locked.  
(b) First agent does not foresee second action:  
Last Monday, on her first day at work, Frank’s new team-mate Beth logged into the 
system at 1:45pm, not knowing that Frank will log in later. Frank logged in from his 
computer at his regular hour. The operation system locked. 
(8) (a) Beth locked the system.   (b) Frank locked the system.  
(b) Beth caused the system to lock.  (d) Frank caused the system to lock. 
 
RESULTS. Results are displayed in Figure 4. On the left-hand side, the results for the individual 
scenarios are shown, on the right-hand side the averages across scenarios. As in the previous two 
experiments, participants preferred statements with an overt causative over a statement with a CoS 
causative when the statement referred to the first necessary but not sufficient cause. Across sce-
narios, there was no clear preference for a particular causative construction for statements referring 
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to the second cause. Note that there was an effect of foreseeability for overt and for the CoS con-
structions. The difference between ratings for the first and the second agent was smaller, when the 
first agent could foresee the action of the second agent (see Figure 4 right hand side).  
 
  
Figure 4: Results of Experiment 3 per scenario (left-hand side) and across scenarios (right-hand 
side). Mean ratings of causal statements and 95% confidence intervals are shown. Higher ratings 
indicate higher acceptance. 
 
The multilevel model allowed to predict participants’ ratings, LogLik = –78.4, Chi2 = 156.8, p < 
.0001, R2 = .10. The following effects were significant: main effect of order (F (1,1355) = 72.8, p 
< .0001), main effect of causative (F (1, 1355) = 36.1, p < .0001), main effect of foreseeability (F 
(1, 1355) = 5.89, p = 0.015), scenario (F (1, 1355) = 6.84, p = 0.001), interaction of order and 
causative (F (1, 1355) = 17.5, p < .0001), interaction of order and violation (F (1,750) = 488.0, p 
< .0001), and the interaction of order and foreseeability (F (1, 1355) = 16.6, p < .0001). Follow-
up analyses of the ratings for CoS showed that there was a significant effect of foreseeability (F 
(1,631) = 4.10, p = .043) and an interaction of order and foreseeability (F (1,631) = 4.09, p = .043). 
The same analysis for overt causatives yielded no main effect of foreseeability (p=.18), but a strong 
interaction effect of order and foreseeability (F (1,631) = 14.2, p = .0002). 
 
DISCUSSION. Again, we found CC-selection to be crucial. When the first agent was the subject of 
the sentence, participants preferred a statement with an overt causative over a lexical causative 
regardless of whether the first agent could foresee the action of the second agent. When the state-
ment referred to the second agent, there was no clear preference for a particular causative 
construction. Foreseeability affected the acceptance with respect to the first agent for overt causa-
tives and CoS verbs, the latter to a lower degree. 
There is an important limitation to the experiments: We manipulated the completion of a suffi-
cient set through temporal order. Therefore, one might argue that the results show that CoS 
causatives are merely sensitive to order (see Einhorn & Hogarth 1986, Henne et al. 2021for the 
effect of order on causal judgments). An ongoing trial tests this possibility. However, note that 
there is a theoretical motivation for why CoS causatives should be sensitive to a completion of the 
sufficient set (Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal 2020), and notably, sensitivity to the completion of a 
sufficient set entails sensitivity to temporal order.  
4. The semantics of the overt causative “cause” and CoS verbs.  We can now consider proper-
ties taken previously as contributing factors to causal selection as parameters in the licensing of 
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linguistic constructions under given circumstances. Accordingly, these factors are taken as part of 
the meaning/truth conditions of the linguistic expressions. 
Our results show that temporal order, and thereby the completion of a sufficient set, had an effect on 
both types of constructions, contra to our second hypothesis, and against the common claim relating 
direct causation with CoS causatives and not with overt ones. In other words, while the findings are in 
line with the “direct causation” analysis of lexical causatives, the effect of temporal order on the overt 
causative is unexpected. Norm violation and foreseeability showed interactions with construction and 
order, which means that these factors affect the acceptance of causative constructions differentially. 
Table 1 summarizes the interactions of order, norm violation and foreseeability with linguistic 
construction. It reveals variation between scenarios (always/sometimes) and also relative influence 
between the two constuctions. The results show that speakers’ evaluations of the adequacy of different 
causal statements vis à vis a particular state of affairs vary systematically, depending on the type of 
linguistic expression employed to describe them. This variation indicates that we must treat CC-
selection independently, and that causal selection depends on linguistic facts (i.e. the choice of 
constructions) and not merely on the metaphysical or cognitive characteristics of the relata.  
 






Order (completion of a sufficient set) Always a factor > Always a factor 
Violation of Norms Sometimes a factor < Always a factor 
Foreseeability Always a factor < Always a factor 
Table 1: Interactions of factors and linguistic constructions across Experiments 1-3 
 
Following these results, we suggest to revise the proposal of Baglini & Bar-Asher Siegal (2020) 
reviewed in Section 2, regarding the selection constraints for both types of constructions. While being 
an INUS condition is probably the basic semantic requirement for using the construction with cause 
to, it is not enough. While it is possible that there are various factors that license the use of this con-
struction, it is possible to offer one systematic principle, for the licensing of the cause to constructions. 
The higher sensitivity to norm-violation (Experiment 2) and to the ability of agents to foresee the 
effect (Experiment 3) both pertain to the degree of responsibility attributed to the condition with 
respect to the effect (see Sytsma et al. 2012 and Samland and Waldmann 2016 for the notions of 
moral responsibility and blame in the context of causal selection). We propose that in assigning the 
role of the cause in the causative construction (i.e., the subject of the sentence), speakers seek to blame 
the specific condition for the occurrence of the effect. Blame can be naturally assigned due to respon-
sibility, but also as a result of a completion of a sufficient set. Accordingly, an event is perceived as 
more “responsible”, or “blameworthy”, for an effect if it is the last to complete the set of sufficient 
conditions (see Henne et al. 2021 regarding the notion of “recency”). If this proposal is on the right 
track, all factors are criteria for the same constraint: the condition represented by the subject of the 
cause-construction must be perceived as the one which is more responsible than the other according 
to at least one parameter. We therefore suggest (9) as a representation of an additional constraint to 
that in (2) on the choice of condition (Q) among all Conditions (Cs): 
 
(9) ∀c∈S (C≠Q Responsibility (Q) > Responsibility (C)) 
 
With respect to the CoS construction, we see that the requirement that the condition represented 
by the subject completes the sufficient set is stronger with this construction. However, we must 
account for two additional facts: in Experiment 2, norm violation was a factor for accepting this 
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construction, and in Experiment 3 we found that, when the agent in the first condition could foresee 
the effect, this condition received a higher rating. In light of this, we wish to make the following 
preliminary proposal according to which foreseeability is also related to the notion of completion 
of the sufficient set. Thus, there are two modes of completion of a sufficient set: An objective 
take: the last event which completes a sufficient set (then only time order matters); and a subjec-
tive take: the last condition that the agent didn’t know would be fulfilled (hence foreseeability 
matters). This difference is formally captured between (10), which repeats (1), and (11), in which 
the model is indexed with a perspective of a certain individual (I below). 
 
(10)   ∃Q∃e∃t∃S:suff(S)M,R = 1 & (Q ∈ S)M & S(e) & τ(e) ⊆ t & ∀t’ < t∀e’ : τ (e’) ⊆ t’ → [¬Q(e’)]  
(11) ∃Q∃e∃t∃S:suff(S)M,I,R = 1 & (Q ∈ S)M,I & S(e) & τ(e) ⊆ t & ∀t’ < t∀e’ : τ (e’) ⊆ t’ → [¬Q(e’)]  
 
According to this, when the agent forsees that the second condition will take place, his own action is 
the last condition that he cannot know would be fulfilled. Therefore, his action subjectively completes 
the sufficient set. In this way we can explain the results from Experiment 3. In Experiment 2, the 
agent violating the norm could expect the occurence of the other condition, therefore it might also be 
a case of a subjective completion of a sufficent set.  
5. Conclusion.  Three experiments demonstrated the significance of CC-selection, by showing 
that the acceptance of a causal statement was affected by the choice of the causative construction. 
Consequently, we took the factors affecting the acceptance of the various constructions to be pa-
rameters that license the linguistic construction under given circumstances. We propose that they 
are components in the meaning of the causative expressions. An important ramification from these 
results is that future studies in cognitive science on causal selection must control for the linguistic 
construction used to express causative relations, thus accounting also for CC-selection. 
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